Has Ukraine really wrested control of the Black Sea from Russia?

Belgium and the European Union are confronting a widening maritime contest after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 8 September that Ukraine had gained control of the Black Sea, while Russian authorities reported Ukrainian drone attacks around St Petersburg, on Russia’s Baltic coast. The developments point to Ukraine’s growing ability to challenge Russian naval and energy infrastructure far beyond the land front, but neither side’s full account could immediately be independently confirmed.

For Belgium-based readers, the immediate connection runs through EU security, food trade and continuing support for Kyiv. The EU is developing closer Black Sea maritime-security cooperation with Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, while Belgium has pledged €4.488 billion in bilateral assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion, according to the Belgian foreign ministry. That includes drones, air defence, mine clearance and the F-16 coalition. Neither Prime Minister Bart De Wever, Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot nor Defence Minister Theo Francken had issued a specific public response to the latest claims at the time of writing.

Zelenskyy’s language should not be read as proof that Ukraine controls every part of the Black Sea. Russia retains warships, aircraft, missiles and occupied bases, including in Crimea, which Moscow annexed illegally in 2014. The more defensible interpretation is that Kyiv believes it has denied Russia uncontested command of key shipping lanes and forced much of the Black Sea Fleet away from Sevastopol. Zelenskyy has made similar arguments before, saying Ukrainian missiles and uncrewed boats pushed Russian vessels away from export routes.

There is evidence for a substantial operational shift. The Associated Press reported in August that Ukrainian missiles and drones struck port and naval infrastructure at Novorossiysk, Russia’s principal remaining Black Sea fleet stronghold. Earlier attacks had already compelled Russia to disperse vessels from occupied Crimea. Commercial traffic from Ukrainian ports has meanwhile continued without the Russian-backed grain agreement that collapsed in 2023. These achievements amount to sea denial rather than undisputed maritime control, an important distinction that Kyiv’s political formulation compresses.

Russia presents the same campaign differently. Moscow describes Ukrainian long-range attacks as terrorism or assaults on civilian infrastructure, and its officials regularly emphasise interceptions rather than damage. Around St Petersburg, Russian authorities reported another wave of Ukrainian drones, but the targets, consequences and interception totals could not all be independently established. Previous verified raids reached oil facilities and Kronstadt, the Baltic Fleet base near the city; Reuters and AP reporting showed that such attacks can disrupt airports, mobile networks, fuel infrastructure and maritime activity even where Russian air defences destroy some incoming drones.

Kyiv calls these operations legitimate strikes against facilities financing or supporting Russia’s invasion. Zelenskyy has described attacks on oil terminals as “long-range sanctions”, framing domestically produced drones as a way to reduce Russian military revenue and stretch its air-defence network. That differs from a simple tally of explosions: Ukraine is attempting to impose costs in both the Black Sea and Baltic regions while its forces face sustained pressure on land.

The EU’s framing is broader still. Its emerging Black Sea security policy stresses safe navigation, protection of critical infrastructure, mine countermeasures, monitoring of Russia’s shadow fleet and cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye. For EU institutions based in Brussels, the issue is therefore not a declaration of Ukrainian victory at sea, but whether shipping corridors can remain open and whether attacks on ports, tankers or energy terminals increase escalation and environmental risks.

Belgium has a specific interest in that balance. Its foreign ministry previously supported the Black Sea Grain Initiative as a safeguard against food insecurity and contributed €10 million to Grain from Ukraine. Antwerp-Bruges and Belgium’s trading economy are not directly exposed to the fighting, but disruption of Ukrainian agricultural exports or Russian energy flows can still affect commodity markets, insurers and European sanctions enforcement.

What follows will be measured less by political claims than by ship movements, export volumes and verified damage. Analysts will watch whether Russia can restore freedom of operation near Crimea and Novorossiysk, whether Ukraine sustains strikes around St Petersburg, and whether the EU turns its Black Sea plans into operational surveillance and infrastructure protection. Until those indicators are clearer, Zelenskyy’s claim is best understood as a statement about a changed balance—not settled ownership of a contested sea.