Who appears on the Iranian newspaper’s ‘revenge list’—and should people in Belgium be concerned?
Tehran municipal newspaper Hamshahri published an online graphic on 11 July 2026 depicting 13 Western and Israeli officials as people who should pay for Ali Khamenei’s death, but there is no evidence that Iran’s government formally endorsed the newspaper’s…
In 30 seconds
- Hamshahri’s online graphic showed 13 officials; it was reportedly absent from the following day’s print edition.
- Trump and Netanyahu appeared with crosshairs marked on their foreheads.
- No Belgian leader appeared in the graphic.
- Mojtaba Khamenei referred separately to a list but did not publicly name its members.
municipal newspaper Hamshahri published an online graphic late on 11 July 2026 portraying 13 Western and Israeli officials as people who should pay for the death of former Iranian supreme leader . The immediate practical takeaway for readers in Belgium is measured but clear: no Belgian official appeared in the image, the graphic is not a confirmed operational target list, and anyone considering travel to should still follow Belgium’s formal advice against all travel.
The image placed US President and Israeli Prime Minister at the top, with crosshairs marked on their foreheads. It also showed US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, US ambassador to Mike Huckabee and US Central Command chief Admiral Brad Cooper. The European figures were French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and military chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir completed the group of 13.
Euronews’ Persian-language service, which identified every person shown, reported that Hamshahri distributed the infographic online but did not include it in the newspaper’s Sunday print edition. That distinction matters. Hamshahri is an ultraconservative publication issued by Tehran’s municipality and operates within Iran’s tightly controlled media environment, but its content is not automatically an official decree or an instruction from the Iranian security services.
The graphic followed a written message from Ali Khamenei’s son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei. According to Euronews’ French-language report, the new supreme leader said Iran had compiled a list of people to be targeted and promised vengeance for his father. He did not identify those people, however, and no publicly available evidence establishes that Hamshahri’s selection reproduces an official government list. The safest description is therefore a newspaper’s implied ‘revenge list’, not a verified Iranian targeting document.
Ali Khamenei was killed in Tehran on 28 February, at the opening of the 2026 US-Israeli war with Iran. Iranian state media confirmed his death, while the authorities declared a prolonged period of mourning and installed an interim leadership structure before Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him. The Associated Press reported during the July funeral ceremonies that mourners and some hardline speakers openly demanded revenge, with Trump named in several chants and displays.
The Hamshahri image turns that atmosphere into highly personalised political propaganda. Showing leaders in prison clothing and placing targeting symbols on two of them collapses the distinction between condemnation, judicial accountability and threatened violence. It also broadens the implied circle of responsibility beyond the American and Israeli officials most directly connected with the war to European leaders accused by Tehran of politically or operationally enabling the campaign.
That does not make the graphic harmless. Public threats by a regime-aligned outlet can normalise violence, signal the preferences of influential political factions or intimidate officials even when they do not amount to an executable plan. At the same time, treating every propagandistic image as proof of an imminent assassination operation would overstate what the evidence supports. Assessing intent and capability remains a job for the security services of the countries concerned.
For people living in Belgium, the direct exposure is limited. Belgium’s prime minister and other Belgian office-holders were not among the 13 people pictured. Belgium nevertheless sits inside the European and NATO security system through which threats against allied leaders are assessed, and Brussels hosts both EU and NATO institutions. That gives the affair a secondary Belgian dimension without making Belgium the centre of the story.
The more immediate Belgian relevance concerns travel and family links. As of its 5 August 2026 update, Belgium’s Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs formally advises against all travel to Iran and asks Belgian nationals already there to leave. It warns of arbitrary arrest and says the Belgian embassy’s ability to help detained citizens is very limited. Belgian-Iranian dual nationals face an additional difficulty because Iran does not recognise their Belgian nationality for consular purposes.
Anyone already in Iran should register through Travellers Online and give contact details to the Belgian embassy in Tehran, the FPS says. Travellers can consult the guidance in French under ‘Conseils aux voyageurs’ or switch to the Dutch ‘Reisadviezen’ version on diplomatie.belgium.be; the warning is federal and does not depend on whether a person is registered at a French-speaking commune or Dutch-speaking gemeente in Belgium. The ministry also advises caution with phones, email, social-media posts, photographs and video because Iranian security services monitor communications.
Where this is happening
View on map Iran →For Iranian and Iranian-background residents in Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders, the publication may also bring a less tangible consequence: alarming online claims presented without the crucial distinction between state policy, regime-aligned messaging and independently verified intelligence. Before sharing translations or screenshots, readers should check whether a report says the list was officially authenticated, who originally published it and whether Belgian authorities have changed their advice.
Two interpretations will now compete. Iranian hardliners present vengeance as a legitimate answer to the killing of the country’s former leader and frame the named officials as responsible for an attack on Iranian sovereignty. The governments whose representatives appear in the image are likely to regard personalised threats as intimidation and as evidence of the risks posed by escalation. Meanwhile, Iranian government opponents may reject both the foreign military campaign and the regime’s attempt to invoke national grief as a mandate for retaliation.
What happens next depends less on Hamshahri’s graphic than on whether Iranian state institutions repeat the names, security agencies identify a concrete plot, or diplomatic channels reduce the confrontation. Until then, the verified facts are narrower than the rhetoric: a regime-aligned municipal newspaper published the image, Mojtaba Khamenei separately referred to an unnamed list, and no public confirmation ties the newspaper’s 13 names to an official operational order.
What to do
Belgium-based readers do not need to take personal action solely because of the newspaper graphic, and no Belgian leader was pictured. Anyone planning travel to Iran should treat the separate official warning as decisive: Belgium advised against all travel as of 5 August 2026. Postpone or cancel planned travel, consult FPS Foreign Affairs before making bookings, and check whether cancellation insurance applies to travel undertaken against official advice. EU and diplomatic staff should follow their employer’s security instructions rather than treating the published names as an authenticated operational list.
Impact
Regional — The direct impact is concentrated in Iran and in the countries whose officials were pictured. Across Europe, the graphic may reinforce diplomatic and protective-security concerns surrounding Iranian retaliation rhetoric.
EvidenceWell established · 1 primary source + 1 official document + 1 independent reporting source · Background sources: 1Explore evidence →Hide evidence ↑
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Voices & reactions
What the main actors are doing
Reported positions, summarised — not direct quotationsIranian hardliners and regime-aligned media
These constituencies portray retaliation as a legitimate response to the killing of Ali Khamenei and cast the officials shown as politically or militarily responsible for an attack on Iran’s leadership and sovereignty.
Governments represented in the graphic
US, European and Israeli authorities have reason to treat personalised threats as intimidation and a potential security concern, while distinguishing propaganda from intelligence establishing a specific, actionable plot.
Iranian opposition and anti-war constituencies
Many opponents of the Islamic Republic may reject the regime’s use of Khamenei’s death to mobilise support for retaliation while also opposing foreign attacks that killed Iranian officials and civilians.
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This story was assembled from verified evidence, with its sources and reasoning recorded as it was written.