Could a German-Dutch gas squeeze force Belgian factories to slow down?

Germany and the Netherlands are keeping emergency procedures for reducing industrial gas consumption ready as Europe approaches winter with a thinner buffer than in recent years. Dutch storage was reported at about 40% in mid-August, far short of its roughly 80% national objective, while Belgium’s sole underground facility at Loenhout stood just under 31% at the beginning of August. The Belgian site had been 75.9% full on 1 June 2025, compared with only 22% on 1 June this year, according to the Federal Public Service Economy.

That does not mean factories are about to be switched off. Germany’s Federal Network Agency, the Bundesnetzagentur, says German gas supply remains stable and that no compulsory reductions apply under the country’s current early-warning phase. Its crisis preparations describe what authorities could do only after a national emergency is declared, including ordering storage withdrawals and directing large consumers to reduce or cease gas use. Germany has no predetermined list showing which factory would be disconnected first: decisions would depend on the weather, available stocks, cross-border flows and the economic and social consequences at that moment.

The Netherlands has developed a comparable last-resort framework. Its Protection and Recovery Plan for Gas allows the government to seek voluntary demand reductions before compelling non-protected customers to cut consumption. Dutch parliamentary documents divide industrial sectors into groups and preserve gas for households, hospitals and other protected users. Food production and activities considered critical to essential supply chains are placed later in the sequence. Some plants would be allowed a minimum “pilot-light” flow, generally set in the draft rules at 10% of their reference use, where a complete stop could damage equipment or create safety and environmental hazards.

The distinction between preparation and activation matters. These plans grew out of the 2022 energy crisis and are designed to prevent officials from improvising during a physical shortage. Updating procedures or testing communication channels is not evidence that rationing has been ordered. The Bundesnetzagentur explicitly says that it cannot establish an abstract shutdown ranking in advance, while the Dutch measures are intended for a declared gas emergency after market-based options have proved insufficient.

The concern is nevertheless real because the refilling arithmetic has deteriorated. An analysis published in July by the University of Cologne’s Institute of Energy Economics put combined EU and UK storage at about 55% at the end of that month, the second-lowest level for that date since 2016. It estimated that LNG imports would have to more than double to lift stocks to 80% by November, in a market where European buyers compete with Asia and where geopolitical disruption can move prices sharply. This is a risk assessment rather than a prediction that shortages will occur.

Belgium enters this picture less as an isolated storage market than as a north-west European gas crossroads. Loenhout’s fixed commercial capacity is about 7.6 terawatt-hours, according to the FPS Economy—small beside Dutch storage capacity of roughly 145 TWh and Germany’s still larger system. Belgium therefore relies heavily on continuous supply through pipelines and the Fluxys LNG terminal at Zeebrugge, while also carrying gas onwards to Germany and the Netherlands.

Fluxys Belgium said flows from its network towards those two countries rose significantly in the first half of 2025. The company recorded a one-day high of 716 gigawatt-hours entering the Belgian grid from Zeebrugge on 6 June 2025. This transit role is a strength: Belgium has diverse entry routes and access to seaborne LNG. It is also an exposure, because a cold winter or an interruption elsewhere can increase competition for the same molecules moving through the regional system.

For Antwerp’s chemical cluster, glassmakers, steel operations, food processors and other heat-intensive businesses, the first consequence would probably be price rather than physical disconnection. Expensive gas raises the cost of steam, industrial heat, fertiliser and electricity from gas-fired power stations. Companies can reduce output before governments intervene, as European industry did during the 2022 price shock. Those effects can then reach households through product prices, employment decisions and higher variable energy contracts.

Households and hospitals are protected customers under European and national emergency arrangements, so Belgian residents would not normally be first in line for compulsory cuts. Protection from disconnection, however, is not protection from a higher bill. Wholesale prices feed into new household contracts with a delay, and costly energy can weaken industrial margins, investment and employment. Belgium’s federal energy regulator CREG and network operator Fluxys would therefore watch not only Loenhout’s percentage but also LNG deliveries, pipeline availability, consumption and the price spread that determines whether traders have a commercial incentive to inject gas.

That incentive is one reason low storage can persist during summer. Traders generally buy gas for storage when the expected winter price covers the summer purchase price, financing and storage charges. When that spread is too narrow—or current gas is already expensive—capacity may remain unfilled even though society values the insurance it provides. Fluxys offered Loenhout capacity again in June after remaining capacity for the 2026-27 storage year went unallocated at a May auction, illustrating the gap that can open between commercial incentives and security-of-supply objectives.

Two views now compete. Market-oriented operators argue that high prices attract LNG, suppress demand and reward additional injections without governments choosing winners. Energy-intensive manufacturers counter that waiting for price signals can destroy production before a physical shortage appears, while public authorities are ultimately expected to protect households and critical industries. The debate is therefore not simply about how much gas exists, but about who pays to hold it and who bears the cost when the buffer is inadequate.

The next checkpoints are the pace of injections through September and October, the arrival of LNG cargoes at north-west European terminals, industrial consumption and the weather outlook. Belgium must reach the EU’s applicable storage trajectory for Loenhout, but its security cannot be read from that small facility alone. There is no confirmed industrial shutdown in Germany, the Netherlands or Belgium. The immediate warning is that a weak buffer leaves Europe—and its interconnected Belgian hub—more dependent on favourable weather, uninterrupted imports and buyers willing to pay for gas before winter begins.