International
ANALYSIS

China's state security ministry accuses foreign agencies of using sea animals

Beijing's unusual claim points to a serious strategic issue: control of underwater data is now part of maritime power.

·12 June 2026·2 min read·
Well established· 1 primary source + 1 official document + 1 independent reporting source · Academic sources: 1

In 30 seconds

  • China's Ministry of State Security says foreign agencies use sensor-fitted marine animals and unmanned devices near Chinese waters.
  • The ministry did not publicly name the alleged operators or disclose where the animals were found.
  • The alleged data includes water temperature, salinity, currents and vessel-related maritime information.
  • The Council of the EU says its 2023 maritime strategy includes underwater infrastructure protection and maritime-domain awareness.

China's Ministry of State Security (China's civilian intelligence and counter-espionage agency, created in 1983) is the state body behind the allegation. WeChat (Tencent's dominant Chinese messaging and social-media platform, launched in 2011) is the channel through which the ministry has increasingly published public security messaging. The South China Sea (a contested maritime region linking China, Southeast Asia and major trade routes) is a recurring flashpoint for surveillance and naval activity. The East China Sea (waters between China, Japan, Taiwan and Korea) includes disputed islands and intensive military monitoring. The Taiwan Strait (the narrow waterway between mainland China and Taiwan) is one of the world's most sensitive military corridors. Sevastopol (Crimean Black Sea port used by Russia's fleet) is relevant because UK defence intelligence previously described Russian dolphin deployments there. The Council of the EU (the Brussels-based institution representing member-state governments) sets EU maritime-security priorities. NATO (the transatlantic defence alliance headquartered in Brussels) is central to European undersea-infrastructure protection.

Background

The Guardian reported that China's ministry linked the allegation to earlier claims about devices in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait. In 2016, China seized a US Navy underwater drone in the South China Sea before returning it, an episode that showed how scientific-looking maritime sensors can become diplomatic incidents. In 2023, UK defence intelligence said Russia had trained dolphins at Sevastopol to counter divers. In Europe, the 2022 Nord Stream explosions and the 2023 Balticconnector incident pushed the EU and NATO to treat seabed infrastructure as a security priority.

The wider picture

The allegation reflects a wider great-power competition over the underwater domain. States want to monitor submarines, protect cables and pipelines, and control data gathered near sensitive coasts. In contested areas such as the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, even civilian or scientific devices can be interpreted as military assets. Europe faces parallel concerns in the Baltic and North Sea after recent infrastructure incidents.

Why now

The story is timely because China's Ministry of State Security published a new public allegation on 12 June 2026, fitting its recent pattern of using public messaging to mobilise counter-espionage awareness and frame national security threats for a domestic audience.

Context & what happens next

What happens next

Watch whether China releases images, locations or technical details of the alleged devices, names a foreign operator, or links the claim to enforcement action against research bodies. For Europe, the next useful signal is the Council and Commission progress report on implementing the EU maritime-security strategy, expected three years after approval.

What to do

Nothing changes immediately for Belgian residents or companies. The practical takeaway is strategic: organisations involved in marine research, ports, offshore energy, telecoms cables or defence should assume that underwater sensors and data-sharing arrangements can be politically sensitive in contested waters and should document the civilian purpose, permissions and data governance of deployments.

How we got here

  1. 2016-12

    China seized a US Navy underwater drone in the South China Sea and later returned it.

  2. 2022-09

    Explosions damaged the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

  3. 2023-07

    NATO allies agreed at the Vilnius summit to establish a Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure.

  4. 2023-10-24

    The Council of the EU approved a revised maritime security strategy and action plan.

  5. 2026-06-12

    China's Ministry of State Security alleged that foreign agencies used sensor-fitted marine animals and devices near Chinese waters.

Evidence
Well established · 1 primary source + 1 official document + 1 independent reporting source · Academic sources: 1
Explore evidence
Euronews, "La Chine affirme que des 'tortues espionnes' etudient son littoral"
Published:
12 Jun 2026, 02:00
Retrieved by ODIN:
12 Jun 2026
Read original
The Guardian, "'Spy turtles' and 'spy fish' being used to monitor Chinese waters, Beijing claims"
Published:
12 Jun 2026, 02:00
Retrieved by ODIN:
12 Jun 2026
Read original
Council of the EU, "Maritime security: Council approves revised EU strategy and action plan"
Published:
24 Oct 2023, 02:00
Retrieved by ODIN:
12 Jun 2026
Read original
Sean Monaghan, Otto Svendsen, Michael Darrah and Ed Arnold, "NATO's Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure"
Published:
19 Dec 2023, 01:00
Retrieved by ODIN:
12 Jun 2026
Read original

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